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THE SUPREME COURT'S WORKLOAD
PROBLEM: CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL
REFORMS
The rapidly expanding and increasingly complex workload of the
Supreme Court of the United States has created what Chief Justice
Warren Burger describes as a "grave problem."' The number of peti-
tions for writ of certiorari which litigants present to the Court for re-
view has increased tremendously during the past thirty years. During
the October term of 1950, 1,181 petitions for writ of certiorari were filed
with the Court;2 while in the October term of 1980, the Court received
4,242 petitions.' As the Court's caseload continues to grow unchecked,
the issues presented to the Court are becoming increasingly complex.'
This substantial increase in the size and complexity of the Court's
workload has two important effects: the quality of the Court's deci-
sions has suffered' and the Court is unable to grant certiorari to a sub-
stantial number of cases which merit further review.
6
There are two proposed congressional reforms that address the
Court's workload problem. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit.Act of 1981 [CAFCA]7 and the Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act of
1981 [SCJA]8 both set forth proposed congressional solutions to the
Court's burgeoning workload. The CAFCA proposes to establish a
National Court of Appeals which would review cases presenting areas
of the law in which the federal circuits are in conflict and which the
Supreme Court is unable to review because of its workload.9 The
SCJA would eliminate the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction
and would thereby provide greater discretion to the Supreme Court in
I. Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger, American Bar Association (August, 1973), reprinted
inpart in A. BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 14 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
BICKEL].
2. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1972), [hereinafter cited as REPRTreprintedin 57 F.R.D. 573, 614 (1972).
3. 127 CONG. REC. S8749 (daily ed. July 29, 1981) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
4. See p. 54 of this note, infra.
5. See pp. 54-55 of this note, infra.
6. See pp. 55-56 of this note, infra.
7. H.R. 4482, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981), S. 1700, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Representative
Kastenmeier introduced H.R. 4482 on September 15, 1981. The House Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice approved an amended
version of H.R. 2405, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. on September 10, 1981. 127 CONG. REC. D 1036
(daily ed. Sept. 10, 1981).
Senator DeConcini introduced S. 1700 on October 5, 1981. The Senate Judiciary Sub-
committee approved S. 1700, which is substantially the same as S. 21, 97th Cong., Ist Sess..
127 CONG. REC. S32 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1981), and S. 1529, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
8. H.R. 2406, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). S. 1531, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Representative
Kastenmeier introduced H.R. 2406 on March 10, 1981. 147 CONG. REC. H864 (daily ed.
March 10, 1981). Senator Heflin introduced S. 1531 on July 7, 1981.
9. 127 CONG. REC. S8749 (daily ed. July 29, 1981) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
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selecting the cases it would review.' ° Both Congress and the Supreme
Court show strong support for these two pieces of legislation.
THE WORKLOAD PROBLEM
Past Remedies
Previous increases in the workload of the Supreme Court have mer-
ited congressional remedies." In 1802 Congress relaxed the obligation
of the Justices to ride circuit when the burden grew unreasonable.' 2 A
rise in the number of cases presented to the Court from 636 in 1870, to
1,816 in 1890' resulted in what then Professor Felix Frankfurter de-
scribed as "a very empiric response to very definite needs."'" That re-
sponse was the Court of Appeals Act of 1891' which divided the
country into nine circuits, each containing an intermediate federal
court of appeals. More importantly, the 1891 legislation produced a
new docket control weapon, the discretionary writ of certiorari.'6
Though the Court of Appeals Act of 1891 initially authorized its use
only in a small percentage of the cases, it provided a ready solution
when the docket size again reached crisis level in 1925. The Judiciary
Act of 1925 converted most of the Court's jurisdiction from obligatory
to discretionary.' 7 This temporarily relieved the workload problem.
The past thirty years, however, have again seen the Supreme Court
burdened with more cases than it can adequately review.
The Present Workload Problem
A rapid increase in the workload of the Supreme Court has again
created serious problems which affect our judicial system. The
caseload has more than tripled in the past thirty years. At the October
term of 1950, there were 1,181 cases filed. At the October term of 1960,
the number had risen to 1,940, and in 1970 to 3,419.18 During the
October term of 1980, the Court received 4,242 petitions.
The increasing complexity of the cases which litigants present com-
pounds this workload problem. Chief Justice Burger states that this
"new" complexity represents even more of an increase in the workload
10. Id
1I. See Bickel, supra note I, at 3.
12. Id
13. Id
14. F. FRANKFURTER & J.M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 13 (lst ed. 1928).
15. Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 828 (1891) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254 (1976).
16. A writ of certiorari is granted at the discretion of the Supreme Court. The writ of certiorari is
an order from the Court calling up the record in a lower proceeding for review. With the
other form of jurisdiction, the appeal, the Court must decide the case on the merits.
17. The Judiciary Act of 1925, § 1, 43 Stat. 938 (1925) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1976),
as amended by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-
452, § 1, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980)).
18. REPORT, supra note 2, reprintedin 57 F.R.D. 573, 614 (1972).
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than the expanding case load reflects.' 9 Complexity increases the
workload due to the additional time required to decide more complex
issues adequately. This, in turn, further reduces the time available to
resolve other issues presented to the Court. During the October term of
1889 virtually every losing litigant in the federal trial court could then
appeal and argue his or her case in the Supreme Court.20 Conse-
quently, the Court dealt with established areas of the law. Only a
handful of constitutional decisions were handled during that term. 2'
The increase in the percentage of constitutional issues which the Court
currently reviews demonstrates that present issues are increasingly
complex.22
THE EFFECT ON THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
MAKING PROCESS
Quality of the Opinions
The prime task of each Justice is to reflect on the nation's most
important constitutional and statutory problems and then to engage in
the difficult and time-consuming process of constructing enduring prin-
ciples of law. Each Justice must set aside time for personal research,
reflection, and collegial exchange. Justice Frankfurter emphasized that
this task presupposes a freshness of mind and adequate time to reflect
and discuss the issues.2 3 Unfortunately, the Court's growing caseload,
compounded by increasingly important and complex cases, has created
an atmosphere at the Court described as "hydraulic pressure."24 Pro-
fessor Henry Hart best states the result of this intense working
atmosphere:
It has to be said that too many of the Court's opinions are about what
one would expect to be written in twenty-four hours. . . . There are
able opinions to be sure, including many that have manifestly taken
much more time than that in thought and composition. But few of the
Court's opinions, far too few, genuinely illumine the area of law with
which they deal. Other opinions fail even by much more elementary
standards. Issues are ducked which in good lawyership and good con-
19. Burger, Report on the Federal Judiciary Branch-1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1129 (1973). Chief
Justice Burger states that reasons for this increase in complexity of the cases presented for
review include loosely drawn statutes from which the Justices must determine the intent of
Congress. He also notes that constitutional claims are asserted which "would not have been
thought of a few years ago." Id
20. Rehnquist, Whither the Courts 60 A.B.A.J. 787, 788-89 (1974). For an indication of the
variety of cases the Court presently decides, see Cox, The Supreme Court 1979 Term-
Foreward" Freedom ofExpression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1,293 (1980) (Table
III, Subject Matter of Dispositions with Full Opinions).
21. Rehnquist, supra note 20, at 789.
22. Compare Frankfurter & Landis, The Supreme Court Under the Jurisdiction Act of 1925, 42
HARV. L. REV. 21 (1928) with The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 293-95
(1980). For example, in the mid-twenties, the Supreme Court decided 23 cases involving due
process. The 1979 term produced 41 due process decisions. Id
23. Ripple, The Supreme Court's Workload- Some Thoughtsfor the Practitioner, 66 A.B.A.J. 174,
175 (1980). Kenneth Ripple is a professor of law at Notre Dame Law School.
24. Id at 174.
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science ought not be ducked. Technical mistakes are made which
ought not to be made in decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States.25
This pressure creates a decrease in the time available for delibera-
tion and results in a rising number of dissenting votes. In 1964 there
were 152 dissenting votes.26 By the 1977 term this had increased to 272
dissenting votes;2 7 while in the 1979 term there were 301 dissenting
votes.2 8
The Court itself agrees that the workload is substantial. Eight of
the current Justices believe that the workload is "heavy and grow-
ing."2 9 Chief Justice Burger, 30 and Justice Blackmun 3 ' agree that the
quality of the Court's opinions suffers under the Court's present work
load.32
Rationing Review
The increasing caseload causes a second problem. The Supreme
Court must severely ration review because of the size of the Court's
docket. In 1937, then Chief Justice Hughes stated that approximately
twenty percent of the petitions for certiorari merited review.3 3 Due to
the high caseload, the present Court can only grant review to a fraction
of twenty percent.3 4 Even though the Court granted certiorari to about
25. Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 100-01 (1959) (quoting Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process.- The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1957)). Henry M. Hart, Jr. is the Charles Stebbins Fairchild Professor of Law
at Harvard Law School.
26. Reiblich, Summary of October 1964 Term, 85 S. Ct. 133, 142 (1965) (Introductory Remarks).
27. Reiblich, Summary of October 1977 Term, 98 S. Ct. 247, 257 (1978) (Introductory Remarks).
28. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 289 (1980) (Table 1, Action of Individ-
ual Justices).
29. Letter from the Justices of the United States Supreme Court to Senator DeConcini by the
full Court, reprinted at 125 Cong. Rec. S4140-41 (daily ed. April 9, 1979).
30. Warren & Burger, Retired Chief Justice Attacks, Chief Justice Burger Defends Freund Study
Group's Compilation and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721 (1973).
31. Letter of Justice Blackmun to Senator Hruska (May 30, 1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 404
(1975).
32. While their views have been thoroughly documented and discussed, a few are worth noting.
Chief Justice Burger contends:
Until someone perfects an eight-or nine--day week or a thirty hour day, the enor-
mous increase in the Court's work over the past twenty years must produce undue
stress somewhere and ultimately affect the quality of the product. To wait to do
something until someone can empirically demonstrate that three or four thousand
cases cannot be processed as well as one thousand is not my conception of how we on
the Court should fulfill our responsibility to the Court as an institution.
Warren & Burger, Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger Defends Freund
Study Group's Compilation and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721, 723 (1973).
Justice Stewart has agreed. "This workload means, I am sorry to say, that there simply is
not so much time as ideally there should be for the reflective deliberation so essential to the
judicial process." Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term--Foreward." Of Time andAtti-
tudes-Professor Hart and Jud~ge Arnold, 79 HARv. L. REV. 81, 83 (1960) (quoting Justice
Stewart from N.Y. Times, April 10, 1960, § 1, at 41, col. 3).
Justice Blackmun has also expressed a concern that the product of his work would be-
come "second rate" because of the caseload problem. See note 31 supra.
33. Brown Transport. Corp. v. Atcon, Corp. Inc., 439 U.S. 1014, 1023 (1978) (White, J.
dissenting).
34. Id
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eighteen percent of the "paid"35 petitions for certiorari in 1955,36 it
presently grants review to less than ten percent of the paid petitions.37
Justice White,38 Justice Powell,39 Justice Rehnquist,4" and former Jus-
tice Stewart4 all contend that there are petitions for which certiorari
should be granted but are not because of the caseload. The Court is
performing at its full capacity and extending plenary review to as many
cases as it can "adequately consider, decide and explain by full opin-
ion."42 While the number of new cases requesting review increases, the
number of cases which the Court can review remains constant. 3
Therefore, cases to which the Supreme Court would have given plenary
consideration thirty years ago are refused review today.
The lack of review creates significant problems. Lack of uniformity
within the federal circuits is increased by the Court's inability to define
important questions of law. Justice White, in his dissent in the denial
of the petition for writ of certiorari in Brown Transport Corp. v. Atcon"
states that the Court is now performing at full capacity and lists numer-
ous cases deserving review which were probably denied certiorari be-
cause of the caseload problem.
Another problem which the caseload causes is an increase in the
number of summary decisions the Court renders. The number of
paid45 cases summarily decided increased from sixty in 196246 to 162 in
the 1976 October term.47 The Supreme Court has increased the
number of its summary decisions in order both to decide more cases
35. "Paid" cases are those petitions submitted by counsel in which the filing fee is paid. The "in
forma pauperis" petitions are layman-drafted requests usually presented by inmates of fed-
eral or state prisons. In 1951 there were 612 paid petitions and 405 informapauperis peti-
tions. By the 1976 term there were 2,019 paid petitions and 2,083 in forma pauperis. Clearly
both have risen dramatically. D. PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT (1980).
36. Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the Court Does Not
Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 341 (1975).
37. See note 28 supra, at 289.
38. See Letter of Justice White to Senator Hruska (June 9, 1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 401
(1975).
39. Letter of Justice Powell to Senator Hruska (June 10, 1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 406 (1975).
40. Justice Rehnquist contends that the main concern is the sufficiency of judicial capacity. Let-
ter of Justice Rehnquist to Senator Hruska (June 10, 1975), reprintedin 67 F.R.D. 407 (1975).
41. Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term-Foreward." Of Time and Attitudes-Professor
Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 84 (1960).
42. Brown Transport Corp. v. Atcon, 439 U.S. 1014, 1023 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
43. Over the past thirty years the number of cases in which the Court has heard oral argument
before reaching a decision has remained relatively constant. See Report of the Study Group
on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 581, 606 (1973). For example, even
though 177 cases were "argued" during the 1973 term, three or four cases are often heard at a
single argument. A total of about 150 "cases heard" is reasonably accurate. Griswold, Ra.
tioning Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the Court Does Not Do, 60 COR-
NELL L. REV. 335, 339 n.23 (1975).
44. 439 U.S. 1014, 1017-22 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). From 1969 to 1973, the number of
dissents from denial of certiorari increased from 237 (involving 188 cases) to 625 (involving
499 cases), Wiggens, The National Court of/Appeals, 13 Trial 36 (1977).
45. See note 39 supra.
46. See Reiblich, Summary of October 1970 Term, 91 S.Ct. 169, 176 (1970) (Introductory
Remarks).
47. See Reiblich supra note 27.
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under discretionary jurisdiction and to dispose of a substantial number
of cases brought under mandatory jurisdiction. Many criticize this
practice" as serving to confuse rather than clarify the law.4 9 This pat-
tern of summary decisions, like the pattern of the increasing caseload,
will intensify without legislative action.
THE CURRENT PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Two current legislative proposals deal with the caseload problem.
The SCJA 5  and the CAFCA5  both propose solutions dealing with
certain aspects of the problems which the Court's workload causes.
The SCJA would remove most of the Supreme Court's mandatory ju-
risdiction and thus give the Court greater discretion in selecting cases
for review. 2 This bill has drawn strong support and is relatively unop-
posed.53 The purpose of the CAFCA is to create a United States Court
48. "While our heavy caseload necessarily leads us to dispose of cases summarily, it must never
lead us to dispose of any case irresponsibly. Yet I fear precisely that is what happened here."
U.S. v. Jacobs, 429 U.S. 909, 910 (1976) (Summarily vacated) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
49. See Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals. The Signifcance of Limited Dis-
cretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U.L. REV. 373 (1972). In Stone v. Graham,
101 S.Ct. 192 (1980) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting.) Justice Rehnquist stated:
I therefore dissent from what I cannot refrain from describing as a cavalier summary
reversal, without benefit of oral argument or briefs on the merits, of the highest court
of Kentucky. Id at 196.
50. See note 8 supra.
5I. See note 7 supra.
52. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary issued a report during the first session of the 96th
Congress on the Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act of 1979, S. 450, which is identical to The
Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act presently before the 97th Congress. In that report the Com-
mittee states:
The main thrust of S. 450 is to eliminate the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
United States to review, by way of appeal, those classes of Federal court cases speci-
fied in 28 U.S.C. 1252 and 1254(2), and those classes of State court cases specified in
28 U.S.C. 1257 (I) and (2). All such cases would remain reviewable by the Supreme
court, as alternatively they now are, by way of certiorari pursuant to either Sec.
1254(l) or Sec. 1257(3). S. 450 further excises three specialized types of statutory
appeals to the Supreme Court from lower Federal courts, causing such cases to be-
come reviewable only by way of certiorari.
S. Rep. No. 35, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. I (1979).
53. In 1978 the nine Justices of the Supreme Court signed a letter urging Congress to pass The
Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act. Letter from the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court to Senator DeConcini, (June 22, 1978), reprinted in 125 CONG. REC. S 4140-41 (daily
ed. April 9, 1979).
Also in 1978, Justice Stevens prefaced his announcement of two opinions of the Supreme
Court with the following oral statement on behalf of the Court:
These two cases will be of interest to a limited segment of the Bar that practices in tax
law and more narrowly in taxation by the states of various business entities. They
both come here by appeal from the highest court of a state, one from the State of
Massachusetts and the other from the State of Iowa.
At least one of these cases almost certainly would not have been heard by the Court if
the Court had discretion to decide whether or not to hear it. They are both here
under our mandatory jurisdiction where the Court must decide on the merits the cases
in which a state court has upheld a state statute against a federal constitutional chal-
lenge. They are examples, at least one of them, of the kind of cases in which the
Court would hope that Congress would consider moving our mandatory jurisdiction.
S. REP. No. 35, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979).
The American Bar Association supports the legislation to the extent that it provides the
Court with greater discretion in selecting cases to review. 67 A.B.A.J. 160 (1981).
The Senate could find no commentator on the Supreme Court who opposed any part of
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of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The new Court of Appeals would
not establish a new tier in the judicial structure, but would operate at
the same level as other federal courts of appeals. This court would
exercise jurisdiction over appeals in areas of the law where Congress
determines there exists a special need for nationwide uniformity. The
area targeted for review by this new court is patent and trademark
law.54
Elimination of Mandatory Jurisdiction
Benefits of the Bill. There are three principal benefits which flow
from the elimination of the Court's mandatory jurisdiction. First, re-
moval of mandatory jurisdiction would eliminate the confusing prece-
dential value of the summary disposition of a substantial number of
cases arriving before the Court under mandatory jurisdiction. Since an
already overburdened Court must decide those cases before the Court
under mandatory jurisdiction, the Court most often removes these
mandatory jurisdiction cases by summary disposition." The Court has
held, however, in Mandel v. Bradley56 and Hicks v. Miranda,57 that be-
cause these summary dispositions constitute decisions on the merits,
they are binding precedent. In a letter to Senator Dennis DeConcini
(D-Ariz.) which discussed the problems which mandatory jurisdiction
causes, all nine Justices observed:
Yet, as we know from our experience, our summary dispositions often
are uncertain guides to the courts bound to follow them and not infre-
quently create more confusion than clarity. From this dilemma we
perceive only one escape consistent with past Congressional decisions
defining the Court's mandatory jurisdiction: Congressional action
eliminating that jurisdiction.5
Removing mandatory jurisdiction from the Court's shoulders will elim-
inate the need to resort to these confusing summary dispositions to ease
the caseload.
Second, elimination of mandatory jurisdiction frees time for cases
more. worthy of review than those brought to the Court through
mandatory jurisdiction. Each case given plenary review simply be-
cause it falls within the obligatory jurisdiction may take the place of
other cases of greater importance. As the Justices have often empha-
the same legislation introduced in the 95th Congress. Hearings on Supreme Court Jurisdiction
Act of 1978 (S. 3100) Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978). (Statement of Eugene
Gressman).
54. 127 CONG. REC. S 31 (daily ed. January 5, 1981).
55. Acknowledged by the Court in a letter from the nine Justices of the United States Supreme
Court to Senator DeConcini, (June 22, 1978), reprinted in 125 CONG. REC. S 4140-41 (daily
ed. April 9, 1979).
56. 432 U.S. 173 (1977).
57. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
58. Letter from the Justices of the United States Supreme Court to Senator DeConcini, reprinted
in 125 CONG. REC. S 4140-41 (daily ed. April 9, 1979).
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sized, the function of the Supreme Court is not to correct the errors of
the lower courts but is to settle questions of general importance to the
nation. 9 Mandatory jurisdiction imposes burdens which make it more
difficult to carry out this function in an efficient manner because the
unnecessary mandatory jurisdiction forces the Justices' attention away
from cases of national importance.
Third, the burden of mandatory jurisdiction adds to the
overburdened Court. The burden posed by mandatory jurisdiction is,
in the Court's words, "substantial." '  Since the function of the Court is
to formulate the national law, obligatory jurisdiction which burdens
the Court and forces a "review for error" is unnecessary.
Likelihood of Passage. The elimination of mandatory jurisdiction is
virtually unopposed, and draws strong support from the Supreme
Court, the American Bar Association, and commentators on the
Supreme Court.6 In 1979, the Senate passed its version of the legisla-
tion from the Ninety-sixth Congress, the Supreme Court Jurisdiction
Act of 1979.62 This legislation died in the House of Representatives,
however, because the Senate bill added Senator Jesse Helms' (Caro-
lina) "prayer amendment,' 63 which restricted the authority of the
Supreme Court of the United States to review state court decisions on
the issue of voluntary school prayer. Though the amendment's consti-
tutionality is ,questionable,6 there is again strong support for a "prayer
amendment."65 Yet, supporters of the bill are optimistic of its likeli-
hood of success, if it can escape the threatened prayer amendment.66
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Benefits of the Bill. Senator DeConcini reintroduced the Federal
59. Id
60. Id
61. See note 53 supra.
62. 125 CONG. REC. S4156 (daily ed. April 9, 1979).
63. Senator Jesse Helms succeeded in adding the "prayer amendment", which proposed to re-
strict the United States Supreme Court's jurisdiction in cases involving voluntary prayer in
public schools and public buildings to The Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act of 1979 just
before the Senate voted to pass the measure. 125 CONG. REC. S 4152 (daily ed. April 9,
1979).
64. Letter from Attorney General Griffin B. Bell to Senator Abraham Ribicoff, (April 9, 1979)
reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. S4144-45 (daily ed. April 9, 1979). See also, Prayer in Public
Schools and Buildings-Federal Court Jurisdiction. Hearings on S. 450 Before the Subcommit-
tee on Courts, Cvil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1980). (Statement of John Harmon, Assistant Attorney
General.)
65. During the first session of the 97th Congress the following bills containing proposals which
would limit the Supreme Court's authority to review state court decisions concerning volun-
tary school prayer have been introduced: H.R. 72, H.R. 408, H.R. 865, H.R. 867, H.R. 869,
and H.R. 989.
66. Robert Feidler states, "If no amendments are added, [The Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act]
is likely to be adopted." Letter from Robert Feidler, Counsel for Senator DeConcini (Febru-
ary 17, 1981); Telephone interview with Mike Remmington, Staff Aid to the House Comm.
on the Judiciary (March 27, 1981).
[Vol. 9:159
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Act of 1981. During the first
session of the Ninety-sixth Congress, the House passed the identical
bill,67 and the Senate passed this legislation in slightly modified form.6"
According to Senator DeConcini only end-of-the-session problems
prevented final passage of this reform in the Ninety-sixth Congress.69
The heart of this bill is the creation of a new appellate court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.7" This court
would have exclusive jurisdiction over all patent and trademark ap-
peals. Such a court would address two problem areas caused by the
caseload. First, the Supreme Court's rare review of patent cases allows
conflicts among lower courts on important questions dealing with pat-
ent law to remain unaddressed. Such intercircuit disparity promotes
unnecessary litigation and forum shopping. The Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, with its nationwide jurisdiction, would provide a
uniform standard of patentability.7 In addition to solving problems
stemming from the Court's inadequate appellate capacity, the new
court will slightly diminish the Court's caseload.72
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stems from a court
termed the "National Court of Appeals" which the Freund Report first
proposed in 1972.71 The purpose of the National Court of Appeals was
to lighten the Supreme Court's caseload by reviewing those cases of
important national interest which the Supreme Court would review in
the absence of a caseload problem. The Freund Report assumed that
lessening the workload of the Court would increase the quality of the
Supreme Court's opinions and would provide the needed uniformity in
those areas which the Supreme Court is presently unable to address.74
The purpose of the Freund Report's National Court of Appeals was to
screen all petitions for certiorari and appeals in addition to resolving
intercircuit conflict. This court would have had the power to deny peti-
tions for certiorari, and such decisions would have been final. The
chief objection to this proposal was the barrier the new court would
67. H.R. 3806, 96th Cong. Ist Sess. (1979), reprintedin 126 CONG. REC. H8775-80 (daily ed. Sept.
15, 1980).
68. S. 1477, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
69. 127 CONG. REC. S 32 (daily ed. January 5, 1981) (prepared statement of Senator DeConcini).
70. The full text of S. 21 appears at 127 CONG. REC. S 31-40 (daily ed. January 5, 1981). This
bill would amend the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1980 by adding a thirteenth
circuit known as the "Federal Circuit." The Federal Circuit would be located in the District
of Columbia.
71. 126 CONG. REC. H8, 780 (daily ed. September 15, 1980).
72. Even though the number of patent cases which the new court will decide does not constitute
a great proportion of the Supreme Court's caseload, the impact of their loss will be more
than their raw numbers would indicate because these cases often contain extremely complex
and time-consuming issues. 126 CONG. REC. H 8780-81 (daily ed. September 15, 1980)
(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
73. The Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court or "Freund Report"
was one of a series of reports prepared by or for the Federal Judicial Center. Professor Paul
A. Freund of Harvard Law School served as chairman of the study group. The report was
published in December, 1972 and is reproduced at 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972).
74. A. BICKEL, supra note i, at 11.
19821
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place before the Supreme Court in the certiorari process. One of its
main critics, Justice Brennan, contended that the subjective nature of
the screening precluded its delegation and that only the Justices them-
selves could adequately perform the duty.75
Support for a national court of appeals gradually faded because of
such objections, until the Hruska Commission proposed a variant of
the National Court of Appeals.76 The Hruska Commission proposed
that the Supreme Court continue to review all petitions for certiorari
and transfer cases of national importance, which the Court could not
review, to the National Court of Appeals. This plan would allow the
Justices to keep full control of the petition process. The Supreme Court
would have the assistance of this intermediate court of appeals in
resolving intercircuit conflicts of lesser issues of national importance.
The proposed Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, like the
Hruska Commission's National Court of Appeals, does not erect any
barrier between the Supreme Court and the review of petitions for certi-
orari. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit could help lighten
the burden on the Supreme Court by resolving conflicts in the federal
circuits concerning issues the Supreme Court could not presently
address.
Likelihood of Passage. Since only end-of-the-session problems pre-
vented this bill from passage in the Ninety-sixth Congress, there is a
substantial likelihood that this bill will become law if the legislation is
passed out of the Senate in sufficient time for the House of Representa-
tives also to act on the bill.7 7 Given the strong support enjoyed by this
proposed legislation, there is a high probability of success.7 8
Other Suggested Reforms
While a long term solution to the Supreme Court's workload
problems may require significant legislation, there are other current
noteworthy proposals. Professor Kenneth Ripple, a former legal officer
of the Supreme Court and former special assistant to Chief Justice Bur-
ger, urges a "more scrupulous adherence to the norms of good practice
and . . . the Court's more rigorous enforcement of its own rules."'7 9
For example, enlargements of time within which to file certiorari are
often requested merely to grant a "comfort factor" to counsel instead of
under "the most extraordinary circumstances.""0 This motion adds to
75. Brennan, The National Court ofAppeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 473 (1973).
76. The Commission on Revision of the Federal Appellate System, or "Hruska Commission,"
submitted its recommendations for changes in the structure and internal procedures of the
federal appellate system on June 20, 1975. Senator Roman L. Hruska was chairman of the
commission. The recommendations are reproduced at 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975).
77. 127 CONG. REC. S 31-32 (daily ed. January 5, 1981).
78. See note 7 supra
79. See note 23 supra.
80. Id.
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the distraction of the Supreme Court." The busy Court could help
itself through insistence on the enforcement of such rules.
Professor Philip Kurland suggests that the Court publicly announce
that it will suspend review on certain categories of cases.82 Professor
Kurland also suggests that the Court voluntarily limit the length of
each Justice's opinion to two thousand words. He proposes that "an
effective editor could reduce the recent pages of the United States Re-
ports by fifty percent or more without losing an iota of substance. 83
Another suggestion is that the Justices completely divide up the peti-
tions for certiorari and leave the decision to accept or deny up to the
individual Justices, with any five other justices having a type of veto
power on an acceptance.8 4
These suggestions, however, only provide a temporary reprieve
from the problem. A long term solution to the ever increasing caseload
demands current congressional action.
CONCLUSION
Supporters of caseload elimination proposals indicate that change,
in the Supreme Court's current appeals and certiorari procedures are
forthcoming. Elimination of mandatory jurisdiction would provide
substantial relief to the Court's present workload. Support for this bill
gives it a strong chance of becoming law, barring other unforeseen
problems. This elimination of mandatory jurisdiction would solve part
of the workload problem and is relatively unopposed.
The need for the Court of Appeals is clear. With the majority of the
Supreme Court and a substantial number of legislators calling for some
type of reform, it is very likely that Congress will pass the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit Act of 1981, along with Supreme Court
Jurisdiction Act of 1981.
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